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PROPENSITY TO JUST MEET OR BEAT QUARTERLY EARNINGS FORECASTS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF SOX SECTIONS 302 AND 906 
 
Stacy Ann Mastrolia, Bucknell University 
 
This paper examines whether the provisions of SOX Sections 302 and 906 are associated with improved quarterly 
financial reporting quality.  SOX 302 and 906 require that senior managers certify the accuracy of their quarterly 
financial statements, and false certification now carries criminal penalties.  Specifically, this paper examines whether 
companies are more or less likely to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts following the implementation of 
SOX 302 and 906.  My results indicate that following Sox 302 and 906, companies are less likely to just meet or beat their 
quarterly earnings forecasts for quarters 2, 3, and 4, suggesting that SOX 302 and 906 are associated with improved 




This paper examines whether companies are more or 
less likely to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings 
forecasts, a proxy for quarterly financial reporting quality, 
post-SOX 302 and 906.  My results indicate that following 
SOX 302 and 906, companies are less likely to just meet or 
beat their quarterly earnings forecasts for quarters 2, 3, and 
4, suggesting that SOX 302 and 906 are associated with 
improved financial reporting quality.     
Following disclosure of some of the most shocking 
corporate frauds in history1, Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). One of the primary goals of SOX 
is to improve financial reporting quality for public 
companies.  The provisions of Section 302 require that the 
CEO and CFO of a public company personally certify the 
accuracy and completeness of the company’s financial 
statements, including the effectiveness of internal control 
over financial reporting and any material changes in internal 
control ("Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002").2   Section 906 
imposes severe criminal penalties for false management 
certifications made knowingly or willfully; these penalties 
far surpass the previous penalties for lying to the auditors.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) clearly 
intends that managements’ increased ownership of and 
liability for the accuracy of the financial statements, created 
by Sections 302 and 906, would improve quarterly (and 
annual) financial reporting quality.   
However, it may be true that the personal certification 
requirement is no more than symbolic; even before SOX, 
antifraud law and the rules governing the disclosure of 
documents to the SEC placed responsibility on corporate 
managers and directors for both the accuracy and the 
completeness of financial statement disclosure, and stated 
the penalty for the failure to disclose (Alverson, 2005; 
Cunningham, 2002; Fairfax, 2002).  Therefore, whether 
SOX Sections 302 and 906 actually affect a company’s 
                                                            
1 Adelphia, Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco, Waste Management, WorldCom, 
and others. 
2 The scope of this certification surpasses the assertions previously made in 
the management letter provided to the auditor.   
quarterly financial reporting quality is an empirical question, 
which I investigate in this paper.   
In addition to determining quarterly financial reporting 
quality following the implementation of SOX Sections 302 
and 906, I propose that, because these sections directly affect 
primarily the cost-benefit function of management (not the 
auditors), these provisions offer researchers a unique 
environment to try to disentangle the “joint measure of 
financial reporting quality” that is a limitation in so much of 
the literature.  In most research designs it is not possible to 
disentangle the separate effects of management and auditors 
on reporting quality and, as a result, most studies can only 
evaluate financial reporting quality as a joint measure of the 
quality of management reporting and the quality of the 
auditor.  Because SOX 302 and 906 in the quarterly 
environment directly change primarily the consequences 
(liabilities) to managers, these provisions, in the quarterly 
reporting environment, should allow us to try to separate 
these effects.  These provisions do not directly change the 
auditor’s role in the quarterly financial reporting process; 
both before and after the implementation of these provisions, 
auditors are responsible for reviewing (not auditing) the 
quarterly financial statements on a contemporaneous basis.    
Existing literature indicates that a company’s ability to 
just meet or beat their earnings estimates is a sign of 
earnings management (or expectations management) and is, 
therefore, a sign of lower financial reporting quality (Cotter, 
Tuna, Wysocki, & Callen, 2006; Matsumoto, 2002; 
Richardson, Teoh, & Wysocki, 2004).   This paper adds to 
that literature by providing evidence of the effect of SOX 
Sections 302 and 906 on a company’s propensity to just 
meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts, and, 
therefore, on quarterly financial reporting quality.   
The quarterly reporting environment is an ideal setting 
to look at managements’ actions for two primary reasons.  
First, previous research indicates that quarterly financial 
statements are subject to more management judgment than 
are annual financial statements because Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) allow some discretion in the 
1
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quarterly timing of recording certain adjustments.3    Second, 
quarterly financial statements are reviewed but not audited 
by the external auditor, potentially allowing more 
management discretion (Mendenhall & Nichols, 1988).  I 
anticipate that Sections 302 and 906 will increase the quality 
of reported quarterly earnings both by providing an incentive 
to managers to improve their estimation process and by 
curbing deliberate earnings management.   
The results of my tests indicate that quarterly financial 
reporting quality improves in the post-SOX period for 
quarters 2, 3, and 4.  This study makes several contributions 
to the literature.  First, the goal of SOX is to improve 
financial reporting quality and this study provides evidence 
that quarterly financial reporting quality improves following 
the implementation of these provisions.  Second, because 
SOX 302 and 906 primarily affect managements’ incentives 
to improve quarterly financial reporting quality, and 
financial reporting quality improves in interim quarters as 
well as the fourth quarter, this study provides some evidence 
that management has improved financial reporting quality 
separate from the effect of the auditor on the financial 
statements.  Third, because my results indicate improved 
financial reporting quality, this study provides some 
indication of an association between increased individual 
criminal liability and changes in managers’ behaviors when 
faced with relatively higher potential personal cost versus 
relatively lower potential personal cost while holding the 
gain function essentially constant.  The results of this study 
should be interesting to policy setters and regulators (SEC 
and PCAOB), auditors, investors, academic researchers, and 
managers.   
 
BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
Selected Sarbanes-Oxley Act Provisions  
 
SOX instituted many corporate reporting, corporate 
governance and auditor-related changes including those 
detailed in Sections 302, 906 and 404.  Section 302 of SOX 
became effective for all SEC registrants for fiscal years 
ending after August 29, 2002.  Section 302 requires the CEO 
and CFO of a public company to personally certify the 
accuracy and completeness of the company’s financial 
statements filed with the SEC,4 including the effectiveness 
of internal control over financial reporting and any material 
changes in internal control.   
                                                            
3 While quarterly revenues are recognized on the same basis as annual fiscal 
periods, APB 28 allows certain costs, that must be expensed during the 
year, to be deferred or accrued at the end of an interim quarter based on  
managements’ expectations about the results for the entire fiscal year.  For 
example, certain expenses (management bonuses, warranty costs, 
advertising costs) may be recorded to expense in interim quarters based on 
forecasted annual sales and adjusted to actual sales at year end (Mendenhall 
& Nichols, 1988). 
4 The public filings and Section 302 certifications for all public companies 
are available at www.sec.gov. 
Some legal professionals have stated that the provisions 
of SOX have altered significantly the prosecutorial 
landscape on which the Justice Department and agency 
investigations will play out (Clayton & Mackintosh, 2002).  
Specifically, Section 302 targets the preferred defense of 
“who me?” offered by individual senior managers during a 
corporate fraud investigation.  Using this defense, the senior 
manager usually demonstrated that he had no knowledge of 
the problem and would have remedied the problem if he had 
known and, the defense went, because the problem was a 
corporate issue not an individual issue, the senior manager 
should not be charged.  Section 302 now requires by law that 
senior managers maintain a system of internal controls 
designed to ensure that material information concerning 
corporate activities are made known to them.  Additionally, 
the senior management of a company is responsible for 
validating that the system of internal controls is functional.  
Fairfax (2002) states that the 302 certification requirement is 
not nominal, but rather subjects a senior manager, who signs 
the certification knowing that it contains material 
inaccuracies, to both civil and criminal liability.   
Recently two accounting studies have examined the 
relation between SOX Section 302 and financial reporting 
quality (Bédard, 2006; Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Doyle, Ge, 
& McVay, 2007; Ge & McVay, 2005; Lobo & Zhou, 2006; 
McEnroe, 2007).  The results of these studies indicate that 
annual financial reporting quality improved following SOX.  
However, there are two significant differences between these 
studies and my study.  First, I examine quarterly, not annual, 
financial reporting quality and, as I explain in this article, 
there are critical differences between quarterly reported 
earnings and annual reported earnings.  For that reason, I 
believe it is important to examine the relation between 
Section 302 and quarterly financial reporting quality, in 
addition to the existing studies on annual financial reporting 
quality.  Second, by using the quarterly reporting 
environment following the implementation of Sections 302 
and 906, this study offers some opportunity to disentangle 
managements’ effect on quarterly financial reporting quality 
from the auditor’s effect; it is impossible to disentangle the 
separate effects of managers and auditors on financial 
reporting quality when examining annual financial reports.  
There is one current working paper I am aware of that 
examines quarterly financial reporting quality following 
SOX; the results in Mastrolia (2010) indicate that companies 
exhibiting aggressive quarterly earnings management pre-
SOX are associated with improved quarterly financial 
reporting quality post-SOX.  
Section 906 requires that each periodic financial report 
containing financial statements filed with the SEC include a 
written statement by the CEO and CFO certifying that the 
report fully complies with the regulations of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information in the report 
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial 
2
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condition and results of operations of the filer.5,6  Section 
906 also imposes severe criminal penalties for CEOs and 
CFOs who knowingly or willfully provide false 
certifications of periodic financial reports.  Executives, who 
knowingly certify a filing that does not meet all of the 
requirements of this section, can be fined not more than 
$1,000,000, or be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both.  Additionally, anyone who willfully certifies a 
statement as noted above, knowing that the filing does not 
meet all of the requirements of this section, can be fined not 
more than $5,000,000, or be imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both.   
To date, Section 906 has not been the subject of much 
accounting research.  Levinsohn (2003) cites a June 2003 
survey by the Association for Financial Professionals7  
regarding the prevalence of a “subcertification” affidavit 
among corporate managers.8   According to Levinsohn, the 
frequency and scope of “subcertifications” would seem to 
indicate that CEOs and CFOs considered the penalties 
identified in Section 906 to be concerning.   
Section 404 of SOX became effective for accelerated 
filers for fiscal years ending after November 15, 2004.9   
Section 404 requires that each annual report (1) contain an 
internal control report which states the responsibility of 
management for establishing and maintaining an adequate 
internal control system and related procedures for financial 
reporting; (2) contain an assessment by management of the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures 
at the end of the most recent fiscal year; and (3) contain a 
statement that the audit firm issuing the audit report attests 
to, and reports on, the assessment of internal controls made 
by management. 
This study attempts to isolate the effect of Section 302 
certifications and the Section 906 penalties on quarterly 
financial reporting quality, in part because it is within this 
environment that this study can offer some contribution 
regarding the actions and motivations of management 
separate from the actions and motivations of the auditor.  
The Section 404 certifications require both managements’ 
certification and an auditor’s opinion resulting in financial 
statements that provide a joint measure of financial reporting 
quality.  In an attempt to separate the effects of Sections 302 
                                                            
5 This sounds similar to the provisions of Section 302, however Section 906 
additionally requires CEOs and CFOs to certify that the report “fully 
complies” with the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act. 
6 The public filings and Section 906 certifications for all public companies 
are available at www.sec.gov. 
7 http://www.afponline.org 
8 Levinsohn suggests that CEOs and CFOs require “subcertification” 
because they typically do not personally prepare the financial information 
included in the 10-Ks and 10-Qs. 
9 Accelerated filers are defined by SEC rule 13b-2 and generally refer to 
public companies with market capitalization of at least $75 million. 
and 906 from those of Section 404, I compare the quarterly 
financial reporting quality for 2001 and 2003.10      
 
Importance of Quarterly Reporting 
 
Existing literature indicates that reported quarterly 
earnings are valuable to investors.  Beaver (1998) developed 
three theoretical links between earnings and share prices: 
current earnings provide information to predict future 
earnings, future earnings provide information about future 
dividends, and future dividends provide information to 
determine share value.  Extensive literature has shown that 
negative earnings surprises often have severe adverse 
valuation consequences (Brown & Caylor, 2005; Dechow, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2003; Skinner & Sloan, 2002) and that 
executives appear to use earnings management techniques in 
order to avoid negative earnings surprises (Barton & Simko, 
2002; Bartov, Givoly, & Hayn, 2002; Burgstahler & Eames, 
2006; Matsumoto, 2002).   
Management can influence interim quarter reported 
earnings for two primary reasons: first the accounting rules 
allow for more management judgment when reporting 
earnings for interim quarters and second, auditors review, 
but do not audit, interim period results.  The Accounting 
Principles Board Opinion No. 28 - Interim Financial 
Reporting (APB 28) contains GAAP for interim financial 
statements (Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 28: 
Interim Financial Reporting, 1973).  As an example, APB 28 
requires that interim financial reports contain reasonable 
estimates of costs or expenses based on all available 
information applied consistently across periods.  However, 
period costs that benefit more than one interim period may 
be expensed as incurred or allocated between interim periods 
based on several methods.11   Because managers use their 
expectations to form cost estimates in interim periods, they 
have greater influence over interim quarterly earnings than 
over fourth quarter earnings. 
Also, because interim quarter reported earnings are 
reviewed but not audited, managers have more discretion 
over interim quarter reported results than over annual results.  
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100: Interim Financial 
Information (SAS 100) states that a review of interim 
financial information is significantly different from an audit 
of financial information because a review consists primarily 
of inquiry and analytical procedures while an audit includes 
substantive audit tests and the collection of corroborative 
evidence (Statement on Auditing Standards No. 100: Interim 
Financial Information, 2002).  The limited scope of the 
auditor’s involvement in the quarterly financial reporting 
process potentially allows management more discretion and, 
thereby, provides a unique environment for this research 
                                                            
10 Section 302 and 906 became effective in 2002 and Section 404 became 
effective in late 2004, so this research design offers an opportunity to isolate 
the effects of Sections 302 and 906 from the effects of Section 404. 
11 For example: estimate of time period expired, benefit received, expected 
sales, expected volumes, etc. 
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project to try to separate the joint measure of financial 
reporting quality.   
 
Measuring Quarterly Financial Reporting Quality 
 
This study investigates whether Sections 302 and 906 
affect managers’ behaviors, resulting in improved quarterly 
financial reporting quality as proxied by a company’s 
likelihood to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings 
forecasts.  Previous literature indicates that the ability of a 
company to just meet or beat by just $0.01 their earnings 
estimate is a sign of earnings management (or expectations 
management) and is therefore indicative of lower financial 
reporting quality (Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi, & McInnis, 
2009; Cotter, et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2002; Richardson, et 
al., 2004).  Specifically, Graham et al. (Graham, Harvey, & 
Rajgopal, 2005) surveyed 400 financial executives who 
admitted to a range of activities they would undertake in 
order to meet or just beat an earnings forecast, including 
decreasing discretionary spending, drawing down existing 
reserves, recording revenues in the current quarter rather 
than the following quarter, and postponing an accounting 
charge.  These authors find that 78% of the surveyed 
executives are willing to give up economic value to meet the 
earnings expectations of analysts and investors.  Graham et 
al. also provide an extensive discussion and survey results 
on why executives are driven to just meet or beat by just 
$0.01 earnings benchmarks.  A large body of empirical 
literature also provides evidence that companies have capital 
market incentives to achieve earnings forecasts (Bartov, et 
al., 2002; Brown & Pinello, 2008; Skinner & Sloan, 2002).  
Based on this existing literature, I would expect that if 
Sections 302 and 906 are effective in modifying corporate 
managers’ earnings management behavior, companies would 
be less likely to just meet or beat by just $0.01 their 
quarterly earnings forecasts post-SOX Sections 302 and 906 
(2003) than pre-SOX Sections 302 and 906 (2001).  This 
leads to my hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis:  Companies will be less likely to just 
meet or beat by just $0.01 their quarterly earnings 
forecasts for each of the four quarters post-SOX 
Sections 302 and 906 (2003) as compared to the 
respective same-quarter pre-SOX Sections 302 and 
906 (2001). 
 
I test the relation between Sections 302 and 906 and 
quarterly financial reporting quality by comparing the 
“same-quarter” periods before and after the implementation 
of these Sections.  I limit my study to companies with 
December 31st year-ends in order to eliminate the 
confounding effects of different year-end dates and different 
seasonality effects.12   The four calendar quarters of 2001 are 
                                                            
12 For example Q2 may not be comparable between a retailer with a 
December 31st year end and a retailer with a June 30th year end. 
defined as the pre-SOX period and the four calendar quarters 
of 2003 as the post-SOX period.  For example, this study 
will compare management’s propensity to just meet or beat 
earnings forecasts for Q1 (Q2, Q3, Q4) of 2001 with Q1 
(Q2, Q3, Q4) of 2003.   
I expect the interim quarter results (Q1, Q2 and Q3) to 
indicate the change in reporting quality due primarily to the 
managers’ effect on financial reporting quality because, as 
stated previously, the auditor’s role in quarterly financial 
reporting did not directly change during the test period.  
However, I expect the Q4 results to indicate the change in 
reporting quality due to both the managers’ effect and the 
auditor’s effect on financial reporting quality as both parties 
play a significant role in the reporting quality for the fourth 
quarter results.  An evaluation of the interim quarter results 
and the fourth quarter results should provide information 
about the relative change in reporting quality attributable to 
both managers and auditors in the time period surrounding 






The provisions of SOX that I am interested in testing 
apply to all U.S. publicly traded companies with December 
31st year ends and available data on IBES and Compustat 
quarterly industrial files in order to calculate the model for 
the four quarters of 2001 and the four quarters of 2003.13 ,14 
All forecast data are the consensus forecasts from IBES.  All 
accounting data are retrieved from the Compustat quarterly 
industrial files.   
 
Empirical Model  
 
I use a logistic regression model to evaluate the 
likelihood that a company would just meet or beat by just 
$0.01 their quarterly earnings forecast before and after SOX 
302 and 906.15   The dependent variable is the likelihood of a 
company to just meet or beat their quarterly earnings 
forecast amounts.  The test variable is the pre-SOX versus 
post-SOX periods.  The model includes control variables for 
factors prior research shows are significant in predicting a 
company’s likelihood of meeting analysts’ forecasts: 
whether a company reports a loss in the period, company 
size and company growth (Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002; 
Richardson, et al., 2004; Skinner & Sloan, 2002).  My test 
model is as follows: 
 
                                                            
13 I will exclude ADRs from this analysis to focus on U.S. companies. 
14 This restriction likely introduces survivorship bias into the sample 
resulting in the inclusion of a higher number of larger and more stable 
companies.  I expect that this bias would cause me to be less likely to find 
results, thereby creating a more conservative test of my research question. 
15As noted above, the pre-SOX period is 2001 and the post-SOX period is 
2003. 
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MBEit = α0 + β1SOXit + β2Lossit + β3Sizeit + β4Growthit + ε  
  
Where: 
MBEit =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company 
either exactly meets or just beats (by $0.01) their 
quarterly earnings forecast for company i in 
quarter t, 0 otherwise; 
SOXit =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the quarterly 
financial statement is for a quarter in 2003, 0 
otherwise; 
Lossit =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company 
reports a loss for company i in quarter t, 0 
otherwise; 
Sizeit  =   natural log of the market value of equity for 
company i at the end of the quarter (t-1); 
Growthit  =   natural log of the market to book ratio for 
company i at the end of the quarter (t-1). 
 
My model includes two observations for each company: 
the pre-SOX 302 and 906 period and the post-SOX 302 and 
906 period.  Because having multiple observations from one 
company can result in serial correlation of the error terms, I 
use robust standard errors in my main analysis and perform a 




Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the 
companies in the sample.  Panel A provides the variable 
descriptive statistics for all observations (10,088 firm 
quarters in total).  Panel B presents the variable descriptive 
statistics for all observations divided into two subgroups: (1) 
observations in which earnings per share does either meet or 
just beat the forecast and (2) observations in which earnings 
per share does not meet or just beat the forecast.  Panel C 
provides the percent of observations that: (1) exactly meet 
the forecast, (2) miss the forecast by more than $0.01, (3) 
miss the forecast by exactly $0.01, (4) beat the forecast by 
more than $0.01, (5) beat the forecast by exactly $0.01, and 
(6) exactly meet or beat the forecast by exactly $0.01.  These 
percents are identified for all observations and separately for 
the pre-SOX and post-SOX observations.  
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix. No correlation 
coefficient exceeds 0.32, indicating that multicollinearity is 
not a factor in the results. 
Table 3 displays the multiple regression results in the 
odds ratio format. These results indicate that companies are 
less likely, post-SOX, to just meet or beat their quarterly 
earnings forecasts in quarters 2, 3 and 4, compared to the 
pre-SOX period.  There is no difference in the likelihood to 
just meet or beat their quarterly earnings forecasts in quarter 
1.  Specifically, the odds ratio of a company either meeting 
or just beating the earnings forecast post-SOX is .70 to 1 in 
quarter 2.  Said differently, the chances of a company either 
meeting or just beating the earnings forecast post-SOX is 
only about 70% of the odds of a firm meeting or just beating 
the forecast in the pre-Sox regime; the odds are lower in the 
post-SOX regime.  Overall, these results support my 
hypothesis and provide some indication that companies have 
improved quarterly financial reporting quality following the 
implementation of SOX 302 and 906.  The likelihood ratio 
chi-square values of 27.11 to 72.02 with p-values of less 
than 0.0001 tells us that my test model as a whole fits 
significantly better than a model with no predictors.  
Additionally I ran both Pearson and Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness of fit tests the results of which suggest that the 
models fit well. 
Table 4 presents the logistic regression results (from 
Table 3) using predicted probabilities to aid in interpreting 
the results.  The results in Table 4 indicate that, with all 
other variables held constant at their mean, the probability of 
a company just meeting or beating by just $0.01 their 
quarterly earnings estimates in quarter 2 was 0.32 in the pre-
SOX period and 0.25 in the post-SOX period.  In quarters 3 
and 4, the probability of a company just meeting or beating 
their quarterly earnings estimates in the pre-SOX period was 
0.31 and .29, respectively, and 0.24 (for both quarters) in the 
post-SOX period. 
My sample includes two observations for each 
company, introducing serial correlation of the error terms.  
To address this issue, I also run a panel data fixed effects 
model. These results (untabulated) are very similar to my 
primary model results for the test variable. 
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Panel A: Variable Descriptive Statistics – All Firms 
Variable 
Number of 
Firms Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
MBE 10,088 0.283 0 0.451 0 1 
SOX 10,088 0.500 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Loss 10,088 0.269 0 0.444 0 1 
Size 10,088 6.843 6.706 1.744 0.749 13.091 
Growth 10,088 0.803 0.734 0.763 -2.459 6.518 
Actual EPS 10,088 0.520 0.250 17.031 -586 1004 
Forecast EPS 10,088 0.515 0.250 15.272 -500 867 
Forecast error 10,088 0.005 0.010 2.759 -176 137 
Panel B: Variable Descriptive Statistics Partitioned by MBE Variable 
Variable 
Number of 
Firms Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
MBE Firms 
SOX 2,857 0.463 0 0.499 0 1 
Loss 2,857 0.222 0 0.415 0 1 
Size 2,857 7.075 6.951 1.763 1.459 13.091 
Growth 2,857 0.942 0.862 0.744 -1.533 5.529 
Actual EPS 2,857 0.286 0.270 0.325 -2.75 2.02 
Forecast EPS 2,857 0.282 0.265 0.325 -2.75 2.02 
Forecast error 2,857 0.004 0.000 0.005 0 0.01 
Non-MBE Firms 
SOX 7,231 0.514 1 0.500 0 1 
Loss 7,231 0.288 0 0.453 0 1 
Size 7,231 6.751 6.609 1.728 0.749 12.819 
Growth 7,231 0.784 0.688 0.764 -2.459 6.518 
Actual EPS 7,231 0.612 0.250 20.115 -586 1004 
Forecast EPS 7,231 0.607 0.240 18.037 -500 867 
Forecast error 7,231 0.005 0.020 3.259 -176 137 
Panel C: Composition of MBE Variable Partitioned by SOX Variable 
  Condition All Firms Pre-SOX Post-Sox 
  Meet 16% 17% 15% 
  Miss 20% 20% 21% 
  Just Miss 5% 5% 5% 
  Beat 47% 45% 48% 
  Just Beat 12% 13% 11% 
  MBE2 28% 30% 26% 
Variable Definitions (firm and quarter subscripts are not presented for simplicity): 
MBEit =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company either meets or just beats (by $0.01) their quarterly earnings forecast for 
company i in quarter t, 0 otherwise; 
SOXit =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the quarterly financial statement is for a quarter in 2003, 0 otherwise; 
Lossit =   is a binary variable that equals 1 if the company reports a loss for company i in quarter t, 0 otherwise; 
Sizeit  =   natural log of the market value of equity for company i at the end of the quarter (t-1); 
Growthit  =   natural log of the market to book ratio for company i at the end of the quarter (t-1); 
Actual EPSit  =   actual earnings per share for company i in quarter t; 
Forecast EPSit  =   analysts’ forecasted earnings per share for company i in quarter t; 
Forecast errorit  =   difference between Actual EPS and Forecast EPS for company i in quarter t; 
Meetit  =   percent of firms that exactly meet their earnings per share forecast for company i in quarter t; 
Missit  =   percent of firms that failed to meet their earnings per share forecast by more than $0.01 for company i in quarter t; 
Just Missit  =   percent of firms that failed to meet their earnings per share forecast by exactly $0.01 for company i in quarter t; 
Beatit  =   percent of firms that meet their earnings per share forecast by more than $0.01 for company i in quarter t; 
Just Beatit  =   percent of firms that meet their earnings per share forecast by exactly $0.01 for company i in quarter t; 
MBE2it  =   percent of firms that either exactly meet (Meet) or beat by exactly $0.01 (Just Beat) their earnings per share forecast for 
company i in quarter t. 
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Variable MBE SOX Loss Size Growth 
MBE 1.000     
SOX -0.046 1.000    
Loss -0.068 -0.057 1.00   
Size 0.084 0.013 -0.254 1.000  
Growth 0.114 -0.018 -0.103 0.319 1.000 





Multiple Regression Results: Odds Ratio Output 
MBEit = α0 + β1SOXit + β2Lossit + β3Sizeit + β4Growthit + ε 
   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
SOX 1.033 0.704*** 0.702*** 0.805** 
Loss 0.795** 0.774** 0.743*** 0.745*** 
Size 1.043 1.047* 1.067** 1.072*** 
Growth 1.226*** 1.292*** 1.390*** 1.481*** 
Observations 2352 2486 2582 2668 
Chi2 27.11 50.10 64.44 72.02 
Prob>Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.018 0.023 0.025 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    




Predicted Possibility of MBE = 1 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX 
Q1 0.2879 0.2947 
Q2 0.3204 0.2491 
Q3 0.3127 0.2420 
Q4 0.2858 0.2437 
 
 
SUMMARY AND LIMTATIONS 
 
This study examines whether the provisions of SOX 
Sections 302 and 906 are associated with improved quarterly 
financial reporting quality.  The results of my study indicate 
that companies are less likely to just meet or beat by just 
$0.01 their quarterly earnings forecasts following the 
implementation of SOX Sections 302 and 906 for quarters 2, 
3, and 4.  
Because the provisions of SOX Sections 302 and 906 
directly change primarily the expectations of management 
related to quarterly filings, this study provides some 
evidence regarding the managers’ effect on financial 
reporting quality separate from the auditor’s effect, to the 
extent that financial reporting quality improved in the 
interim quarters as well as the fourth quarter.  These results 
would seem to indicate that managers modified their 
earnings management behavior in the post-SOX Sections 
302 and 906 period resulting in improved quarterly financial 
reporting quality.   
A limitation of this study is the inability to isolate the 
effect on quarterly financial reporting quality of actions 
taken by management on their own initiative versus actions 
taken by management or by the auditor at the request of the 
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Board of Directors or the Audit Committee.  It is possible 
that either the Board or the Audit Committee required 
management or the auditor to take certain actions or make 
specific changes to their normal processes during the time 
period of my analysis either as a result of SOX or the macro-
environment in general.  Because I cannot observe the 
actions of the Board or Audit Committee, the result is (best 
case) noise in my model or (worst case) correlated omitted 
variables.  While I have tried to isolate the effects of 
Sections 302 and 906 in my research design this study, at the 
very least, should provide useful information about quarterly 
financial reporting quality during this very interesting time.   
Another limitation of this study is the use of a 
company’s propensity to just meet or beat earnings estimates 
as a proxy for financial reporting quality.  A company’s 
likelihood to just meet or beat their earnings forecasts could 
be the result of earnings management or expectations 
management.  I propose that it is unlikely that the provisions 
of SOX or the general investor climate during my test period 
had a direct effect on a company’s intent to manage 
expectations so I attribute the results of this study, and least 
primarily, to the result of earnings management. 
Subject to these limitations, this study makes several 
contributions to the literature.  First, it provides evidence 
that the implementation of Sections 302 and 906 is 
associated with improved quarterly financial reporting 
quality.  Second, it provides some evidence regarding 
managements’ effect on quarterly financial reporting quality 
separate from the auditor’s effect because this study 
indicates that the interim quarters 2 and 3 are associated with 
improved quarterly financial reporting quality as well as the 
fourth quarter. Third, my results provide an indication of an 
association between increased individual criminal liability 
and changes in manager’s behavior.  As a result of these 
contributions, the results of this study should be interesting 
to policy setters and regulators (SEC and PCAOB), auditors, 
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